Zscaler 블로그
Zscaler 블로그의 최신 업데이트를 이메일로 받아보세요
Intelligence Insights: December 2023
SocGholish, XMRig, and Cobalt Strike make their way up the chimney in this month’s edition of Intelligence Insights
This article was originally published by Red Canary, which is now part of Zscaler.
Each month, the Intel team provides Red Canary customers with an analysis of trending, emerging, or otherwise important threats that we’ve encountered in confirmed threat detections, intelligence reporting, and elsewhere over the preceding month. We call this report our “Intelligence Insights” and share a public version of it with the broader infosec community.
Highlights
To track pervasiveness over time, we identify the number of unique customer environments in which we observed a given threat and compare it to what we’ve seen in previous months.
Here’s how the numbers shook out for November 2023:
| Last month's rank | Threat name | Threat description |
|---|---|---|
⬆ 1 | Collection of Python classes to construct/manipulate network protocols | |
➡ 2 | Open source tool that dumps credentials using various techniques | |
⬆ 3 | Dropper/downloader that uses compromised WordPress sites to redirect users to adversary infrastructure posing as necessary browser updates to trick users into running malicious code | |
⬇ 4 | Activity cluster characterized by the delivery of an information stealer and .NET RAT via search engine redirects | |
⬆ 5* | Penetration testing tool that integrates functionality from multiple offensive security projects and has the ability to extend its functionality with a native scripting language | |
⬇ 5* | Malware family used as part of a botnet. Some variants are worms and frequently spread via infected USB drives | |
⬇ 5* | LummaC2 | Information stealer sold on underground forums and used by a variety of adversaries; may also be used as a loader for additional payloads |
⬆ 5* | NetSupport Manager | Legitimate remote access tool (RAT) that can be used as a trojan by adversaries to remotely control victim endpoints for unauthorized access |
⬆ 9* | Open source tool used to identify attack paths and relationships in Active Directory | |
⬆ 9* | Charcoal Stork | Suspected pay-per-install (PPI) provider that uses malvertising to deliver installers, often disguised as cracked games, fonts, or desktop wallpaper |
⬇ 9* | Penetration testing framework used to probe systematic vulnerabilities on networks and servers and conduct post-exploitation activity on compromised hosts | |
⬇ 9* | Activity cluster using a worm spread by external drives that leverages Windows Installer to download malicious files | |
⬆ 9* | RedLine | Information stealer sold on underground forums and used by a variety of adversaries |
⬆ 9* | Activity cluster that uses a distribution scheme similar to SocGholish and uses JScript files to drop NetSupport Manager onto victim systems | |
⬆ 9* | XMRig | Monero cryptocurrency miner that is often deployed as a secondary payload |
⬆ = trending up from previous month ⬇= trending down from previous month ➡ = no change in rank from previous month
*Denotes a tie
Observations on trending threats
Our top 10 threats this month ended up being a top 16, with an atypical 7-way tie for 9th place. SocGholish was more active this month, moving up to 3rd after placing just off the list at no. 11 last month. This is the highest SocGholish has been in the top 10 since April 2023. Cobalt Strike also saw an increase in activity that landed it in a 4-way tie for the 5th spot. Major U.S. holidays are often an active time for adversaries, and we saw a jump in both attempted Cobalt Strike use and BloodHound use during the week of Thanksgiving this year.
The reindeer games are XMRigged
One of our 9th place ties is XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency miner, making its first appearance in our top 10. We typically see a few instances of XMRig every month, and saw enough in November for it to squeak into the top 10 list. XMRig by itself is a fairly benign open source miner available on GitHub. While, like all cryptominers, it uses system resources for its mining activity, it does not contain any additional malicious code.
Sometimes deploying XMRig is the adversary’s primary goal, but frequently XMRig is deployed as a secondary payload in an attempt to monetize threat actors’ access to victim systems. In November 2023 alone, researchers reported campaigns deploying XMRig alongside other malware families like Rhadamanthys and Cobalt Strike.
Here at Red Canary we saw XMRig delivered multiple ways last month. One example was very similar to activity reported by the DFIR Report in 2022. We assess the adversary likely brute forced access to a public-facing MySQL server then uploaded malicious DLLs and a custom loadable function to execute the DLLs. The adversary wrote a number of additional files to disk, including a renamed instance of cscript.exe, the XMRig binary, and additional scripts used to install and execute XMRig. They also created a scheduled task for persistence.
Detecting XMRig depends on how it is delivered. In the above example we saw at Red Canary, unusual cscript.exe activity gives us a detection opportunity.
Detection opportunity: Windows Script Host wscript.exe or cscript.exe making network connections to a suspicious top-level domain (TLD)
The following pseudo-detection analytic identifies wscript.exe or cscript.exe making network connections to a suspicious top-level domain (TLD). Malicious scripts, like those used in the example above to install XMRig, may connect to infrastructure hosted on unusual TLDs. This is atypical behavior, although custom admin scripts may reach out to personal domains. The analytic below leverages a custom-made suspicious domain list, based on observations and research on abused TLDs shared by teams like Unit 42.
process == (wscript, cscript)
&&
has_netconn
&&
command_includes (domain strings matching *suspicious_tlds)
Note: You can create a list of suspicious TLDs to reference in *suspicious_tlds based on in-house observations and industry research. The Red Canary list includes: .date, .cf, .ga, .casa, .cyou, among others.
The 2023 Threat Detection Report
이 게시물이 도움이 되었나요?
면책 조항: 이 블로그 게시물은 정보 제공만을 목적으로 Zscaler에서 작성하였으며, 정확성, 완전성 또는 신뢰성에 대한 어떠한 보증도 없이 "있는 그대로" 제공됩니다. Zscaler는 제공된 정보를 기반으로 수행된 조치나 오류 또는 누락에 대해 어떠한 책임도 지지 않습니다. 이 블로그 게시물에 링크된 제3자 웹사이트나 리소스는 편의를 위해서만 제공되며, Zscaler는 해당 웹사이트의 콘텐츠나 관행에 대해 책임을 지지 않습니다. 모든 콘텐츠는 예고 없이 변경될 수 있습니다. 이 블로그에 접속함으로써 귀하는 본 약관에 동의하며 귀하의 필요에 따라 정보를 확인하고 사용할 전적인 책임이 귀하에게 있음을 인정합니다.
