Signed Dridex Campaign

TARUN DEWAN - Manager, Sandbox

agosto 24, 2015 - 3 Minuti di lettura

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Contenuto

Articolo
Altri blog

Introduzione

Malware authors use various means to make their malware look similar to legitimate software. One such approach involves signing a malware sample with a digital certificate. Recently we saw Dridex malware authors using this technique while reviewing the samples in our Cloud Sandbox. Dridex is a banking Trojan which typically arrives to a system via malicious spam email with a Microsoft Office file as an attachment. These files will have embedded macros that lead to the download and installation of the Dridex Trojan. Dridex then attempts to steal the victim's banking credentials and system information.

Signed Dridex campaign

Here we came across one malicious attachment with an encrypted macro that downloads signed Dridex samples from 81.17.28.101/bt/bt/sti[.]php. This Dridex sample is packed using a custom packer, which is is compiled with .NET. The current Dridex is signed with a certificate that is issued to Private Person Parobii Yuri Romanovich. This certificate as been specially created for spreading the Dridex malware.

Certificate

We also saw the following signer information in the certificates used for signing the Dridex executables:

PJSC "BIZNES AVTOMATYKA
AVTOZVIT Scientific Production Private Company
Private Person Parobii Yuri Romanovich

The certificates were all issued by COMODO and we observed the following URLs serving the signed Dridex malware:

185.14.29.214/bt/bt/sdp [.] php
81.17.28.101/bt/bt/sti [.] php
5.196.241.204/bt/bt/ched [.] php
217.12.203.171/bt/bt/freda [.] php
94.250.252.13/bt/bt/stata [.] php
149.202.146.176/bt/bt/chdid [.] php
93.170.105.60/bt/bt/grtes [.] php

Below are the Dridex samples served from the aformentioned URLs. All tof he samples are packed with the same .NET packer mentioned above:

5CA1DBA1C72AC999E221DE98BBC584C4
9E73E0C4B92253C5F8B6648F29B28B5B
CD243B30B9BBD682C082CFEFDBF79ACD
E578618F2D38FC251D52D1366144404F
5F907702CE229937955B4DCE92EC4575
DC443FBB5FB6125EBEEEBEC2E4BAA372
0BBC8CD08E9958ACDE0519A2B2840CD7
9D1D0632329F04D8B1EC21AFF4CE6493
32230D747829DCF77841F594AA54915A
8F1A9A9830FF02C5C2BA4C17DFE8B09D
00DCA835BB93708797A053A3B540DB16
393E2145F4C3E9B5697A2AAEB25AA8D3
1992170FDC642D4A99A7BC82BA82FA31
9261B8EAF1DA3D9CFF522875A7198667
FB67C85F3F42D3E48B9E7B7637D30858
E578618F2D38FC251D52D1366144404F

Dridex Packer:
The Dridex sample is embedded in the resource section of the packer. After unpacking, it drops a Borland Delphi executable file. The following is the snapshot of encrypted resource section:

Encrypted Resource Section

Dridex Activity:
The current Dridex sample tries to connect to different IPs included in the config file. The config file for the sample is embedded in the sample itself. In the config file we observed a botnet ID and list of C&C servers. Below is a snapshot of config file:


Configuration file

Dridex collects and sends the following system information to one of the C&C mentioned in the config file:

Computer Name
nome utente
Windows Version
Botnet ID

Information sent to the server

Below is the complete list of C&Cs it tries to connect.

80.247.233.18
91.121.82.113
69.164.213.85
79.143.191.147
199.241.30.233
162.243.12.14
188.93.73.90
195.154.184.240

Conclusione

The use of a legitimate certificate in signing malware executables to evade security detection is not new but is still very effective. The malware author aims to exploit the Code-Signing Certificate based allowlist approach by signing their samples. Zscaler ThreatlabZ is actively monitoring these signed malware campaigns and ensuring coverage for our customers.

Analysis by Tarun Dewan and Nirmal Singh

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