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Abyssos: Technical Analysis of a New Modular RAT

THREATLABZ

août 10, 2026 - 12 Min de lecture

Threat Research

Contenu

Introduction
Key Takeaways
Technical Analysis
Conclusion
Zscaler Coverage
Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)
Autres blogs

Introduction

In late June 2026, Zscaler ThreatLabz identified a new malware family that we track as Abyssos. Abyssos is a new modular remote administration tool (RAT) written in C++ that supports a variety of features including credential theft, file exfiltration, and remote access via VNC. Abyssos is in active development with multiple version numbers and different obfuscation passes that are designed to improve evasion from security products.

In this blog post, ThreatLabz provides a technical analysis of Abyssos, including its core features, configuration, obfuscation, network communication protocol, and capabilities.

Key Takeaways

In late June 2026, ThreatLabz identified a new malware family, Abyssos, which provides remote administration capabilities.
Abyssos uses different intermediate representation (IR) passes, most likely using a publicly available LLVM obfuscator (e.g. Pluto) to thwart binary analysis.
Abyssos uses a custom TCP protocol for network communication.
Abyssos supports a number of different network commands and downloads additional modules from the command-and-control (C2) server to enhance its capabilities.
Although not extensively used, ThreatLabz identified a few samples of Abyssos that implemented anti-analysis techniques.

Technical Analysis

In the following sections, ThreatLabz provides a technical analysis of Abyssos version 2.4F, including its obfuscation methods, anti-analysis techniques, network protocol, and supported commands.

Anti-analysis

Abyssos uses common obfuscation methods as an anti-analysis measure. ThreatLabz identified the following techniques:

Checks for the presence of hypervisors. Specifically, Abyssos uses the CPUID instruction to detect the presence of hypervisors, including VMware, KVM, Xen, and VirtualBox. If it detects any of these, Abyssos terminates execution.
Checks for the following process names and exits if any are running:
- vmtoolsd.exe
- vmwaretray.exe
- vmwareuser.exe
- VBoxService.exe
- VBoxTray.exe
- VBoxControl.exe
- xenservice.exe
- prl_tools.exe
- qemu-ga.exe
- spice-vdagent.exe
- vdservice.exe

Furthermore, Abyssos uses a set of different intermediate representation (IR) passes to obfuscate the binary code. ThreatLabz assesses with medium-to-high confidence that Abyssos developers use open-source LLVM-based obfuscators to achieve these results. Overall, we have observed different obfuscation passes including:

Control flow flattening
Bogus control flow with common opaque predicates
Constant integer encryption
Stack-based string obfuscation

ANALYST NOTE: Not all samples identified implement the anti-analysis techniques. For example, the most recent version of Abyssos does not include them.

Initialization phase

Before executing its core functionality and features, Abyssos performs the following initialization steps:

Dynamically loads any required Windows API functions and libraries. Abyssos iterates the export directory of each loaded library, calculates the CRC32 checksum of the exported function, and compares the result against the expected/passed CRC32 checksum value.
Abyssos creates a mutex in order to ensure that only one instance of itself is currently running. Abyssos appends either the string _Admin or _User depending on the current user rights. Interestingly, Abyssos checks if the command line includes the parameter --elevated. This parameter appends the string _Admin to the Abyssos mutex name regardless if the current user actually has administrator privileges. The mutex name is hardcoded in the binary and follows the format Global\[UUID4]. For example Global\68AA60E5-6C45-4C01-9F0E-E25FC57C652F.
Initiates a TCP connection with the C2 server.
Collects host information such as the CPU architecture, computer name, username, user's integrity level, public IP, and country of origin.
Sends the host’s information to the C2 server along with the binary’s internal version to register the compromised system. The formatting string is HELLO|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|v2.4F|%s|%s|%s.
Abyssos creates a dedicated thread for network communication. This thread is responsible for receiving, parsing, executing, and reporting the output of any supported network commands.
Lastly, Abyssos starts sending the network command PING to the C2 server every few seconds and waits for a network command to execute. Any incoming packet is received and parsed on the previously created thread.

Network communication

Abyssos primarily uses AES in GCM mode with a hardcoded 32-byte key for encrypting both incoming and outgoing network data. The only exception is for the encrypted Abyssos modules, which have an additional layer of encryption using either AES-CBC (with a 16-byte key/IV) or using a bitwise XOR operation (as described later in Table 2).

The Abysoss network packet structure is shown below.

#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct network_packet
{
 uint32_t data_size;
 uint8_t unknown_flag; // Unknown, set to `1` by default
 uint8_t iv[12];
 uint8_t* data;
 uint8_t aes_tag[16];
};
#pragma pack(pop)

Abyssos supports a plethora of network commands. The two tables below describe each command's name and functionality along with any supported parameters.

ANALYST NOTE: Abyssos uses the pipe character “|” to delimit network command parameters. For example, the network command PM_KILL|1234 terminates the process with PID 1234.

Network Command Name	Description
PONG	Response to the `PING` command.
DISCONNECT	Abyssos stops execution.
HVNC_START	Starts a VNC session with a screen width/height as an optional parameter. The default screen settings are 1920x1080.
HVNC_STOP	Stops the VNC session.
HVNC_INPUT	Simulates mouse movement and keyboard in the VNC session.
HVNC_CLONE_START	Copies a specified browser's folders/data (e.g. cookies) in the fontconfigs folder located under the Windows temporary directory.
HVNC_PROG	Starts a specified application under the VNC session. These applications must already be present on the host, since Abyssos does not download them. The list of supported applications and their corresponding parameters are: chrome: Starts the Chrome browser. chrome_cdp: Starts the Chrome browser and injects cookies. Specifically, Abyssos creates an instance of Chrome with the debugging port 9222. Then Abyssos connects to it (using the WebSocket protocol) and sets the cookies stored at `fontconfigs\cookies.json` into the Chrome instance by using Chrome’s API function `Network.setCookie`. The purpose of this is to hijack browser sessions. notepad: Opens the Windows Notepad application. cmd: Starts a command shell. powershell: Starts PowerShell. explorer: Starts a Windows Explorer instance. vivaldi: Starts the Vivaldi browser. opera: Starts the Opera browser. firefox: Starts the Firefox browser. edge: Starts the Microsoft Edge browser. brave: Starts the Brave browser. iexplore: Starts Internet Explorer. thunderbird: Starts the email client Thunderbird. emclient: Starts the email client eM Client. foxmail: Starts the email client Foxmail. If the substring `_cloned` is included in the parameter, then Abyssos attempts to use cloned/copied data from one of the web browsers above.
HVNC_MAXIMIZE	Displays the maximized VNC window.
SYSINFO	Gets system host information. This includes: Username Computer name User’s integrity level/privileges Windows version CPU architecture Country code (based on public IP) Public IP Number of CPU logical processors Total RAM of the system System’s uptime GPU name
DNS_ADD	Adds a new (specified) record to the Windows `hosts` file.
DNS_DEL	Deletes the specified record from the Windows `hosts` file.
FM_COPY	Locally copies a file/directory.
CLIPBOARD_START	Starts a thread that intercepts clipboard data every second.
CLIPBOARD_STOP	Stops the clipboard interception thread.
UAC_BYPASS_FODHELPER	User Account Control (UAC) bypass method via the Windows `fodhelper` binary.
UAC_BYPASS_ICMLUAUTIL	UAC bypass method via COM interface `ICMLuaUtil`.
GRABBER_START	Creates a thread that scans and collects specified directories/files based on parameters. The available parameters are: dirs: Names of directories to scan. exts: File extensions to collect. max: Maximum file size to collect. ExcludeDir: List of directories to exclude from scanning.
GRABBER_STOP	Stops the grabber thread.
PM_LIST	Collects information about the system's running processes. The process information includes: Process ID Process name Process's filepath Process memory size Process uptime
PM_START	Creates a thread that collects the system's running process information every 3 seconds.
PM_STOP	Stops the system's process information collection thread.
PM_KILL	Terminates a process by PID.
PM_SUSPEND	Suspends a process by PID.
PM_RESUME	Resumes a suspended process by PID.
SHUTDOWN	Shuts down the compromised host.
REBOOT	Reboots the host.
SLEEP	Puts the compromised system in sleep mode.
RESTART	Restarts Abyssos.
PF_START	Creates a thread that collects active TCP/UDP connections along with their associated processes every 2 seconds.
PF_STOP	Stops the thread that collects active TCP/UDP connections.
PF_KILL	Terminates a process by PID. The only difference with PM_KILL is that this command requires an extra (unknown) parameter.
FM_LIST	Lists files and directories along with their associated metadata in the specified directory.
FM_DEL	Deletes a file/directory.
FM_GET	Uploads a specified file from the compromised host to the C2.
FM_EXEC	Executes an already existing file on the compromised system.
FM_ARCHIVE	Compresses the files of a specified directory into a ZIP archive and sends them to the C2 server. The ZIP archive is stored in-memory only.
FM_ADDTOARCHIVE	Same as `FM_ARCHIVE` but the ZIP archive is written to disk and then sent to the C2.
FM_PUT	Downloads a file from the C2 server on to the host.
REMOTEDESKTOP_START	Creates a new thread that starts a screen recorder.
REMOTEDESKTOP_STOP	Stops screen recorder thread.
REMOTEDESKTOP_SETQ	Sets the quality (number of pixels) of any screenshots/images taken from the screen recorder.
KEYLOGGER_GETLOGS	Reads the captured keystrokes obtained from the keylogger by reading the hardcoded file `windows_update_cache.json` (located in the Windows temporary folder).
EXECURL	Downloads and executes a file. Abyssos will try to delete this file 5 seconds after it has been executed.
EXECURL_AES_HOL	Downloads encrypted shellcode and injects it into a specified process (by name). Abyssos decrypts the encrypted payload using AES-CBC. The network packet contains a 16-byte value that is used for both the AES key and IV. The downloaded file is deleted after the code injection.
EXECLOCAL_HEX	Receives a Windows executable file as a hex string and executes it. The downloaded file is deleted after it is executed.
EXECLOCAL_AES_HOL	Same as `EXECURL_AES_HOL`, but the payload is already embedded in the network packet.
AESHOL_DLL	Same as `EXECLOCAL_AES_HOL`. One notable difference is that this command supports payloads that have a maximum size of only 4,096 bytes.
SELF_DELETE	Abyssos deletes itself using the Windows shell command `cmd.exe /C ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3 >nul & del /F /Q file_path`.
C2CMD	Starts a remote shell session (using `cmd.exe)` with the C2 server.

Table 1: Network commands supported by Abyssos.

The table below describes the Abyssos modules (although they were not available at the time of our analysis) and decryption methods.

Network Command Name	Description	Decryption Method
KEYLOGGER	Likely a keylogger module written to disk under the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `klog`. The module is executed via the export function name `abyss`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
RECOVERY	Possibly a Chrome credentials harvester module. The module is stored under the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `rcv`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
RECOVERY_GECKO	Likely a module that recovers Firefox credentials. The module is stored under the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `rvg`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
SENDTXT	Unknown purpose. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `plg`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
SENDTXT2	Unknown purpose. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `plg`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
HDRPFILE	Unknown purpose. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `plg`. The export name to execute the downloaded module is `abyss`.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV `1234567890abcdef`.
DCFINDER	Likely a module that scans the network to locate the Domain Controller. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `dcf`. Abyssos executes the module's export function `GetDCFinderText`.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV `1234567890abcdef`.
VULNSCAN	Likely a module that scans the network or compromised host for vulnerabilities. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `vul`. Abyssos executes the module's export function `GetVulnScanJson` and sends the resulting output to the C2.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV 1234567890abcdef.
ELEVATE_SYS_TOKEN	Likely a module to escalate token privileges to `SYSTEM`. The module is not executed if the current user has `SYSTEM` privileges. The downloaded module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `plg`. Abyssos executes the module's export function `abyss`.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV `1234567890abcdef`.
DATASCAN	Unknown purpose. The encrypted module is stored under the Windows temporary folder location with a random filename with the suffix `datascan.png`. Once decrypted, Abyssos deletes it. The decrypted module is stored in the same temporary folder but with the prefix string `ds` and a random filename. Abyssos executes the module's export `GetDataScanText`.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV `1234567890abcdef`.
GRABCOOKIES	Likely a module that recovers browser cookies. The module is stored under the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `gc`. The module's export name is `abyss`. After executing the module, Abyssos searches and sends any files located at `%TEMP%\fontconfigs\` to the C2 server. This command might be combined with the aforementioned network command `HVNC_PROG`.	Bitwise XOR with key `1234567890abcdef`.
RDPWRAP	This module may be related to the open source library `rdpwrap`.The module is written to the Windows temporary folder with a randomly generated filename and the prefix `rdp` followed by a randomly generated name. The exports `abyss` and `GetRdpWrapText` are executed and any results are sent to the C2 server.	Decrypted using AES-CBC with the key and IV `1234567890abcdef`.

Table 2: Abyssos network commands requiring external modules.

Conclusion

Abyssos is a new malware with post-exploitation framework features that provides filesystem access capabilities and expandable modular functionality. Abyssos leverages different obfuscation methods such as control flow flattening and string encryption to complicate reverse engineering along with techniques to evade malware sandboxes and analysis environments. Considering its active development, ThreatLabz expects Abyssos to continue to evolve.

Zscaler Coverage

Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to Abyssos at various levels. The figure below depicts the Zscaler Cloud Sandbox, showing detection details for Abyssos.

Figure 1: Zscaler Cloud Sandbox report for Abyssos.

In addition to sandbox detections, Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to Abyssos at various levels with the following threat names:

Win64.PWS.Abyssos

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)

IOC	Description
52b400c5be1557a8df146f62fde76d906e7e0a92ed76788717ef61c758f315aa	Abyssos sample version 2.4F
213[.]145.86.42	Abyssos C2
ca94d95413210a2a325155740eb8a5c58627ad5c4e704478621e7fc8165fe173	Abyssos sample version 2.1F
209[.]99.184.223	Abyssos C2

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