We are pleased to announce our IPO on March 16, 2018.

Zscaler will now be traded on Nasdaq under the symbol ZS.


ATECH-SAGADE Badness - Malicious .IN Campaign

By: ThreatLabz


ATECH-SAGADE Badness - Malicious .IN Campaign

I'm working on generating our Q2 2010 Stats and Trends report, and I noticed a large number of blocked exploit kit activity from domains registered with the .IN TLD. These were not hacked sites but domains registered for the explicit purpose of supporting a criminal enterprise. This activity is on-going. As the post will show, the campaign involves leveraging exploit kits to exploit known vulnerabilities on client applications and installing various payloads including installing various wares to monetize pay-per-installs.

A large number of the the malicious domains have been hosted on: -

These IPs belong to the owned by ATECH-SAGADE:

Which other ATECH-SAGADE netblocks have been described as "evil" in blog posts from earlier this month:

"Evil network: Sagade Ltd / ATECH-SAGADE" -- Dynamoo

"Basically, – is completely evil and has no legitimate use as far as I can see." -- ComputerSecurityArticles

"Exploits, Malware, and Scareware Courtesy of AS6851, BKCNET, Sagade Ltd." -- ComputerSecurityArticles

There have also been a number of recent malicious sites related to this .IN campaign seen on the ATECH-SAGADE netblock as well, for example:
which currently resolve to, .15, and .16.

Here is a snippet of what we've seen and blocked related to this ongoing .IN campaign:

Other open-source research show several of these sites still live on this /24, for example:

Here is an example of the WHOIS for one of the malicious .IN domains:
Russian based information and self-resolving domain. The name servers currently resolve to and respectively on the same ATECH-SAGADE netblock.

Here is a small snippet from the exploit kit hosted on the .IN domains:
I believe this is from the SUTRA exploit pack. In any case, here is an example of an earlier Wepawet report from analyzing one of these .IN sites:
The exploits detected from the report are CVE-2009-0927 and CVE-2007-5659
And the ActiveX controls:

While many of the payloads include Trojan Downloaders and FakeAV, there have been some other wares installed via this campaign. VirusTotal has shown that some of the payloads dropped by the kit are undetectable via anti-virus:

The sigcheck on the artifact shows it as System Explorer by the Mister Group:
Secunia has a brief advisory posted on the Mister Group and their System Explorer here.

The Mister Group has a few pages setup for their System Explorer:

From the above, it seems that this campaign is largely driven by pay-per-install profit.

Suggested Blogs