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Security Research

Tracking 15 Years of Qakbot Development

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Introduction

Qakbot (aka QBot or Pinkslipbot) is a malware trojan that has been used to operate one of the oldest and longest running cybercriminal enterprises. Qakbot has evolved from a banking trojan to a malware implant that can be used for lateral movement and the eventual deployment of ransomware. In August 2023, the Qakbot infrastructure was dismantled by law enforcement. However, just several months later in December 2023, the fifth (and latest) version of Qakbot was released, marking more than 15 years of development. In this blog, we will analyze Qakbot from the first version dating back to 2008 through the most recent version that continues to be updated as of January 2024. Our analysis demonstrates the threat actor behind Qakbot is resilient, persistent, and innovative.

Key Takeaways

  • Qakbot originated in 2008 as a banking trojan designed to steal credentials and conduct ACH, wire, and credit card fraud.
  • In recent years, Qakbot has become an initial access broker delivering Cobalt Strike for lateral movement and ultimately resulting in second-stage infections including ransomware like BlackBasta.
  • Over the years, Qakbot’s anti-analysis techniques have improved to evade malware sandboxes, antivirus software, and other security products.
  • The malware is modular and can download plugins that enable it to dynamically add new functionality.
  • The threat group behind Qakbot has now released five distinct versions of the malware with the latest release in December 2023.

A Brief History of Qakbot

ThreatLabz researchers have been tracking Qakbot for more than a decade and our analysis started with samples that date back to 2008. These early versions of Qakbot contained a date timestamp rather than a version number. However, we will refer to these samples as version 1.0.0 for clarity and consistency with subsequent versions. At that time, Qakbot leveraged a dropper with two embedded components in the resource section that consisted of a malicious DLL and a tool to inject the DLL into running processes. The Qakbot DLL implemented a wide variety of features including: a SOCKS5 server, stealing passwords, harvesting web browser cookies, and spreading via SMB. These early versions were heavily developed and even had a feature to report crash dumps. In 2011, Qakbot introduced a versioning system that started with 2.0.0 that has signified major developmental milestones over time. The Qakbot major version number is a three-digit hexadecimal value with 0x500 (or 5.0.0) being the most recent. 

Qakbot was largely used for banking fraud until 2019, when the threat actor pivoted to serving as an initial access broker for ransomware including Conti, ProLock, Egregor, REvil, MegaCortex, and BlackBasta.

The following timeline illustrates the key developments for each version of Qakbot.

Timeline of Qakbot evolution

Each version of Qakbot represents a snapshot in time and is indicative of the threat landscape during that period. For instance, early versions contained hardcoded command-and-control (C2) servers. As time progressed, law enforcement and malware researchers worked successfully with domain registrars to suspend malicious domains. In response, the Qakbot threat actor added network encryption and implemented a solution to remove the C2 server’s single point of failure by adding a domain generation algorithm (DGA). While a DGA addressed the single point of failure issue, it also created significant noise when querying for a large number of domains. As a result, the Qakbot developer devised a new multi-tiered architecture that leveraged compromised systems to act as proxy servers that relay network traffic between other infected systems and the backend C2 infrastructure. This design update addressed the single point of failure problem, reduced network traffic, and effectively hid the subsequent C2 tiers.

In the following sections, we will analyze key areas where Qakbot has evolved significantly including anti-analysis techniques, network communication, and the implementation of a modular design.

Anti-Analysis Techniques

Qakbot has implemented anti-analysis techniques from the beginning of its development including string obfuscation, API obfuscation, and malware sandbox evasion. 

String obfuscation

Every version of Qakbot since its inception has obfuscated the malware’s important strings with a simple XOR algorithm. The XOR key (and most recently, the derivation of an XOR key) is used to decrypt strings. Moreover, the reference structure to the strings has also evolved across versions.

In the first two versions (1.0 and 2.0), the malware decrypted a block of strings from the data section, overwriting the original encrypted block, and the unencrypted strings remained in memory as shown in Figure 1. This simple design was likely an attempt to evade static antivirus signatures.

 

Figure 1. Early versions of Qakbot string obfuscation

Figure 1. Early versions of Qakbot string obfuscation

In later versions of Qakbot, the XOR key length was significantly increased, and strings were decrypted and copied to a newly allocated buffer. Qakbot version 5.0 made perhaps the most significant change to the string encryption algorithm. The strings are still encrypted with a simple XOR key. However, the XOR key is no longer hardcoded in the data section. Instead the XOR key is encrypted with AES, where the AES key is derived by performing a SHA256 hash of a buffer. A second buffer contains the AES initialization vector (IV) as the first 16 bytes, followed by the AES-encrypted XOR key. Once the XOR key has been decrypted, the block of encrypted strings can then be decrypted as shown in Figure 2.

Qakbot 5.0 string decryption

Figure 2. Qakbot 5.0 string decryption

API obfuscation

In versions 1 and 2, Qakbot carried a list of Windows API names used by the malware in the encrypted strings table. After the strings table was decrypted, the code would dynamically resolve the address of each API at runtime and then initialize a table of pointers that could then be used by Qakbot to invoke the corresponding function when required. This implementation made it harder for malware researchers and antivirus software to statically determine the APIs used at runtime.

In more modern versions, the Qakbot developer further obfuscated the use of APIs by resolving the imports using a CRC32 hash rather than a string. At first, Qakbot used the CRC hashes of the API name directly, and subsequent versions performed an XOR with a hardcoded value and the CRC hash. Figure 3 shows an example of this dynamic API import hashing algorithm.

Figure 3. Example Qakbot API obfuscation

Figure 3. Example Qakbot API obfuscation

Junk code

Over time, Qakbot has introduced blocks of code that are deliberately non-functional to defeat static antivirus signatures as shown in Figure 4. In the example below, a block of junk code was added prior to an RC4 initialization routine.

Figure 4. Example of Qakbot junk code block in an RC4 initialization function

Figure 4. Example of Qakbot junk code block in an RC4 initialization function

Anti-sandbox techniques

Qakbot has implemented numerous detection mechanisms to identify researcher environments and malware sandboxes since the earliest versions. In particular, Qakbot has attempted to identify processes, system artifacts, and the underlying virtual machines associated with an analysis environment. Figure 5 shows an example of Qakbot’s implementation to identify whether an infected system is running on a VMWare virtual machine from a sample dating back to September 2009.

Figure 5. Qakbot implementation to identify VMWare

Figure 5. Qakbot implementation to identify VMWare

Qakbot has continuously added code to identify analysis environments by checking system information such as the name of BIOS vendors, processes, drivers, etc. for strings as shown in Table 1.

vmxnet

vmx_svga

vmrawdsk

vmdebug

vm3dmp

vSockets

srootkit

sbtisht

ansfltr

Xen

XENVIF

XENSRC

XENCLASS

XENBUS

Vmscsi

VirtualBox

Virtual Machine

Virtual HD

VirtIO

VRTUAL

VMware server memory

VMware SVGA

VMware SCSI

VMware Replay

VMware Pointing

VMware Accelerated

VMware

VMW

VMAUDIO

VIRTUAL-DISK

VBoxVideo

QEMU

PROD_VIRTUAL_DISK

MS_VM_CERT

CWSandbox

20202020

    

Table 1. Qakbot virtual machine string-based detections

The following processes in Table 2 are frequently used by malware analysts and are also detected by Qakbot:

frida-winjector-helper-32.exe

packetcapture.exe

filemon.exe

proc_analyzer.exe

sniff_hit.exe

frida-winjector-helper-64.exe

capturenet.exe

procmon.exe

sysAnalyzer.exe

sysAnalyzer.exe

tcpdump.exe

qak_proxy

idaq64.exe

sniff_hit.exe

BehaviorDumper.exe

windump.exe

dumpcap.exe

loaddll32.exe

joeboxcontrol.exe

processdumperx64.exe

ethereal.exe

CFF Explorer.exe

PETools.exe

joeboxserver.exe

anti-virus.EXE

wireshark.exe

not_rundll32.exe

ImportREC.exe

ResourceHacker.exe

sysinfoX64.exe

ettercap.exe

ProcessHacker.exe

LordPE.exe

x64dbg.exe

sctoolswrapper.exe

rtsniff.exe

tcpview.exe

SysInspector.exe

Fiddler.exe

sysinfoX64.exe

FakeExplorer.exe

apimonitor-x86.exe

idaq.exe

dumper64.exe

user_imitator.exe

Table 2. Malware analyst process names detected by Qakbot

Around version 404.510, the malware developer added extraneous exports to the Qakbot stager DLL to confuse malware sandboxes as shown in Figure 6. In this example, the export name Wind (or ordinal #458) is the actual entry point.Figure 6. Qakbot 404.510 sample with 458 entries in the exports directory

Figure 6. Qakbot 404.510 sample with 458 entries in the exports directory

Network Communication

Qakbot has leveraged HTTP for C2 communication from the beginning. However, the network protocol on top of HTTP has changed significantly over the years with encryption, RSA signature verification, and the addition of a JSON-based message format.

Network protocol and encryption

Qakbot has continuously updated its message protocol with version 19 being the latest. The protocol specifies the format of the message. In version 3, Qakbot sent requests in a format similar to the following:

code sample

However, this protocol format was later replaced with a JSON-based protocol with integer key values that denote specific fields as shown below:

code sample

This encoding adds a layer of obfuscation for each of the message fields.

Qakbot’s network encryption has used RC4 with the key consisting of 16 random bytes concatenated with a hardcoded salt and hashed using SHA1. The most recent version of Qakbot now uses AES encryption with the key consisting of 16 random bytes concatenated with a hardcoded salt and hashed using SHA256. After encryption, the data is Base64 encoded and prepended to a variable in the body of an HTTP POST request.

Domain generation algorithm

The first versions of Qakbot only used hardcoded C2s as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Example of hardcoded Qakbot C2s

Figure 7. Example of hardcoded Qakbot C2s

However, in version 2.0.1 a DGA was added as a backup C2 channel in the event that the hardcoded C2s were unreachable. Qakbot used a time-based DGA to generate up to 5,000 C2 domains for a specific date interval as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Qakbot DGA code

Figure 8. Qakbot DGA code

Interestingly, some versions of Qakbot would generate fake domains if an analysis environment was detected in an effort to mislead researchers, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Example of Qakbot generating fake domains if network monitoring tools were detected

Figure 9. Example of Qakbot generating fake domains if network monitoring tools were detected

Data exfiltration to compromised FTP servers

Qakbot versions 3.0.0 and earlier used compromised FTP servers to exfiltrate data rather than sending the data directly to their C2 server. The FTP credentials were stored in Qakbot’s configuration files as shown below:

code sample

This design had an inherent weakness since anyone with the FTP credentials could potentially have accessed and recovered the stolen information. To address this weakness, Qakbot was later updated to send the stolen data directly to Qakbot’s C2 infrastructure.

Using compromised systems as relays

After version 3.2.4.8, Qakbot ceased using the DGA. Instead, Qakbot started using compromised systems themselves as C2 servers, and embedded a list of IP addresses and port numbers in the malware configuration. Before version 4.0.3.2, the configuration file (stored as an encrypted resource) contained the list of IP addresses in a text-based format:

code sample

However, after version 4.0.3.2, the Qakbot C2 list evolved into a binary format as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Qakbot C2 list binary format

Figure 10. Qakbot C2 list binary format

Commands

In the first versions of Qakbot, the server sent commands in a descriptive text-based format. The following commands were supported in Qakbot versions 1.0 and 2.0:

  • certssave
  • ckkill
  • cksave
  • clearvars
  • cron
  • cronload
  • cronsave
  • forceexec
  • ftpwork
  • getip
  • install3
  • instwd
  • kill
  • killall
  • loadconf
  • nbscan
  • psdump
  • reload
  • rm
  • saveconf
  • sleep
  • socks
  • sxordec
  • sxorenc
  • sysinfo
  • thkill
  • thkillall
  • uninstall
  • update
  • update_finish
  • uploaddata
  • var
  • wget

In order to obfuscate these commands, the Qakbot author replaced these string commands with integer values starting in the later builds of version 3.

Addition of RSA signature verification

Qakbot version 3.0.0.443 introduced RSA digital signatures (initially using the MatrixSSL library) to prevent tampering. This was especially important when the DGA and compromised systems were used as C2 servers.

Modular Structure

The design of Qakbot has changed significantly from versions 1 through 5. In particular, the malware has become more modular with the ability to dynamically add new features without releasing a new version of Qakbot. Modern versions use a lightweight stager responsible for initializing, maintaining persistence, and establishing C2 communication to request commands and modules.

Embedded resources

Prior to version 4.0.2.19, Qakbot frequently used the resource section to store configuration information (such as web injects and application parameters) as well as DLLs that performed malicious behavior. Initially, in version 1.0, these resources were not encrypted. However, Qakbot’s code evolved with various encryption algorithms to protect these resources.

Qakbot version 2.0 implemented a custom XOR-based algorithm as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Custom encryption algorithm used by Qakbot 2.0 to protect resources

Figure 11. Custom encryption algorithm used by Qakbot 2.0 to protect resources

In this example, the offset 0x7 in the encrypted resource contained a WORD that was the size of the XOR key. The XOR key was located at offset 0x9 in the resource. Encrypted data was then concatenated after the XOR key. Python code that replicates this algorithm is shown below:

code sample

Qakbot version 3.0 and later used an RC4-based algorithm to decrypt the resources. 

The initial 0x14 bytes in the resource served as the RC4 key for decrypting the remaining data.  A slightly modified version of the BriefLZ library was later added to compress specific resources to reduce the overall file size.

In version 4.0.2.1, the resource encryption algorithm changed slightly. The first 0x14 bytes of the resource were no longer used as an RC4 key. Instead, the code contained a salt value in the encrypted strings table that was then hashed using SHA1 to derive the RC4 key used to decrypt the resource. In version 4.0.3.902 this was improved again, which added two layers of RC4 to decrypt the resource. The first RC4 layer was decrypted using the SHA1 hash of the salt string. The second layer used the first 0x14 bytes of the result as the key to decrypt the following data. Example Python code for this algorithm is shown below:

code sample

Plugins

In version 4.0.1, Qakbot was modified to split various functionality into separate modules. This allowed Qakbot to use a stager to download additional modules from Qabkot’s C2 servers to add functionality on-demand. Qakbot has built modules to hook web browsers, steal email addresses (and email), harvest stored credentials, deploy Cobalt Strike, and act as a C2 server that relays traffic between other infected systems and the backend infrastructure.

Conclusion

Qakbot is a sophisticated trojan that has evolved significantly over the past 15 years, and remains remarkably persistent and resilient. Despite the significant disruption to Qakbot in August 2023, the threat group remains active and recently updated their codebase to support 64-bit versions of Windows, improved the encryption algorithms, and added more obfuscation. This demonstrates that Qakbot will likely remain a threat for the foreseeable future and ThreatLabz will continue to add detections to protect customers.

Zscaler Cloud Sandbox

Zscaler sandbox coverage

Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects payloads with the following threat names:

Win32.Banker.Qakbot

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)

Date

Version

Sample Hash

2008-08-28

1.0.0

34588857312371e4b789fb49d2606386

2009-11-16

1.0.0

8c33780752e14b73840fb5cff9d31ba1

2009-12-29

1.0.0

37bbdaf1d14efa438f9ff34d8eeaa5e7

2010-10-12

1.0.0.63

d02252d88c3eab14488e6b404d2534eb

2011-05-12

2.0.0.685

b9e23bc3e496a159856fd60e397452a0

2012-05-31

2.0.1.1432

570547fa75c15e6eb9e651f2a2ee0749

2013-07-08

2.0.1.1457

42e724dc232c4055273abb1730d89f28

2014-06-24

2.0.1.2544

9160ea12dbce912153b15db421bb87da

2015-01-28

2.0.1.2674

945ba16316c8a6a8428f0b50db0381dc

2015-12-17

3.0.0.116

dca0ef26493b9ac3172adf931f1a3499

2016-01-04

3.0.0.180

6718c6af4b89cffd9b6e0c235cf85bd2

2016-01-04

3.0.0.275

8fbb43dc853d0b95829112931493fe22

2016-01-13

3.0.0.262

72125013ac58d05adb32b7406b02c296

2016-01-29

3.0.0.322

3b4a2e984a51210d0594c9b555ba4e0d

2016-02-09

3.0.0.333

f952dc1e942ebdfb95a2347263265438

2016-02-12

3.0.0.352

b849381ab6a4e97d32580bb52d15cb7d

2016-03-08

3.0.0.443

dc8b137d5d61b23dbbb6085ce46bfcdb

2016-04-05

3.0.0.468

327a5e491d6db899d9db4c6bdc8f5367

2016-04-05

3.0.0.473

e3b0e54777ca9fd9863e3563a1b7dd59

2016-04-06

3.0.0.506

2e9261e75e15540ef88327a480a5b10e

2016-04-26

3.0.0.580

a472b9dd64198d739c6e415bbcae8a6f

2016-05-19

3.0.0.739

8609e6e4d01d9ef755832b326450cbe9

2016-06-01

3.0.0.743

a7cc19cde3a1a78b506410e4ffafdbef

2017-04-27

3.1.0.723

581016035f95327e7e1daac3ad55ae0e

2017-05-16

3.1.0.733

361d46f32a93786b34b2ac225efc0f79

2018-02-06

3.2.2.381

89e6f171c29255d6b4490774c630ad14

2019-09-16

3.2.3.91

ff186a1ef9e83c229940ff2dd4556eaf

2020-01-22

3.2.4.8

bea66da7088bd20adbfed57cf350a6a4

2020-01-22

3.2.4.8

1cd7a95064515625ad90464a65ea4d94

2020-03-03

3.2.4.53

08c51514a42eec6ccbbc7a09a8258419

2020-03-20

3.2.4.70

d8ff9d18cd622c545d21b199a2d17594

2020-04-01

3.2.4.75

2e658f5fa658651331cb5b16447bdbe2

2020-04-29

3.2.4.136

ca22283396dbe21fa2ef5e27c85ffae6

2020-05-07

3.2.4.141

e9d0e767a5c5284ab33a3bb80687cf63

2020-05-07

3.2.4.141

d8841201c9d32b5e885f4d035e32f654

2020-05-28

3.2.4.401

82d7c5ea49c97059bbec02161b36f468

2020-08-07

3.2.5.42

163ee88405bccc383c7b69c39028bf9a

2020-08-07

3.2.5.42

acf65632b7cdc40091daec58bf8830bc

2020-08-113.2.5.43455c543243f5216e21ba045814311971

2020-08-11

3.2.5.43

cfc77e4421d830e73c6f6040a4baedd4

2020-11-03

3.2.5.83

40a9bdac882285ab844917d8b5b75188

2020-11-24

4.0.1.29

6b1771b883c0b3ffdc3f5923f45c1f93

2020-12-15

4.0.1.138

0a3caa2845251b8fb5ab72f450edd488

2021-03-12

4.0.1.194

4a6e7f055d5bf4fd6d2a401c1b3d18ab

2021-04-12

4.0.2.1

dc2acf1704456880208146c91692cfc8

2021-04-15

4.0.2.12

3ca1f0e708283f21c9a10ef4acf40990

2021-04-15

4.0.2.12

1e71ea79c5a70bb8c729037132855b5a

2021-04-22

4.0.2.12

66a87dbc24af866849646911f4841a28

2021-04-29

4.0.2.68

25984af48fa27ec36bd257f8478aa628

2021-04-29

4.0.2.68

c1849c1ee3b8146c6fb836dae0b64652

2021-05-06

4.0.2.68

d45e04df3c9270a01e9fb9e4e8006acc

2021-09-20

4.0.2.318

9a1c1497428743b4e199f2583f3d8390

2021-09-27

4.0.2.363

0865757dfe54c2d01c5cef5bfd3162c5

2021-09-27

4.0.2.363

c6dea1f4e6ee1ed4c0383cd1af456649

2021-11-03

4.0.3.1

1d4952cbe998312fd2bf810535db8a20

2021-11-03

4.0.3.1

6cce1ec83d1428de9fcb0c3791efabd1

2021-11-04

4.0.3.2

e111d982dc0c12f23fa3f446d674600b

2021-11-04

4.0.3.2

751f7d8ad6b2308cd1750fc23f606b53

2021-12-09

4.0.3.10

8bb4208a50c041f9cdfc26815905eab3

2022-02-10

4.0.3.490

bcb8e64c5a69c7a572ca34450712fb2f

2022-02-14

4.0.3.491

54e3f20f74c1089e89841798ffaac084

2022-02-14

4.0.3.503

95adeb6a1c1e0a9d9ee4ecafb6079b37

2022-02-15

4.0.3.509

da206d25fddf3286f42ec7626d8bb676

2022-02-18

4.0.3.532

3ba490216d4cdf92661444d896fefac3

2022-02-24

4.0.3.549

8fa26ff07c3b5e1653e55b8a567b7623

2022-02-24

4.0.3.549

1253695c63136edb1f6b37bbfd83db55

2022-04-06

4.0.3.573

2853985cab3c5b83eec38ae1f3a890be

2022-04-29

4.0.3.573

5e7deb4acb4429498693bc45db68978a

2022-05-04

4.0.3.674

2273dd59ca71c4f078cab09d93093294

2022-05-04

4.0.3.675

40d5e775a52c94842c97d012eb94efdc

2022-05-044.0.3.683f1d47a4dc1d11b17e51419299dc282e4

2022-05-12

4.0.3.684

2f17bd9f4b9edd91a7fd80ef32981f70

2022-05-18

4.0.3.686

7dcbd74778754eee85810a4393d8e3ef

2022-05-184.0.3.688e9e9d194f3ee9822852309cc83455eea

2022-05-23

4.0.3.689

019117f66e43de489b3ff56377f9907b

2022-05-24

4.0.3.690

28f84ffa14c7ef3936a00d3bd751bdb3

2022-06-07

4.0.3.694

d88ee89344d04f83eacd3614785560ef

2022-08-31

4.0.3.780

3ff9d9dbf8c7a6865faeb43188afa6b4

2022-09-06

4.0.3.858

3e86ac10b4e7d818e0f410130bb7f237

2022-09-08

4.0.3.860

377acb7149fdfa56c090d9a12619a53c

2022-09-15

4.0.3.892

e5ebdec7417ad847e4325c4114e41809

2022-09-20

4.0.3.894

c23d2cd7d10a5f88032ddfcab4cfe146

2022-09-28

4.0.3.895

050ce5fb25ffd3e907a5c81a6711fcea

2022-10-04

4.0.3.914

b857efb30d9e35bc83a294580ad8cc3a

2022-10-10

4.0.3.967

6dc027269262b93351633eb8af4623ef

2022-10-11

4.0.3.973

e5eb07b009ca666f91ef5fe48269ca52

2022-10-25

4.0.3.1051

0971b8e78fcc6f9158e279376116c8c4

2022-10-26

4.0.4.2

4fbebc9879ec1f95e759cb8b5d9fb89d

2022-10-28

4.0.4.14

66a0741f8f43b584e387459b367097c1

2022-10-31

4.0.4.20

6d61a88890be4ab5116cb712ff7788f4

2022-11-08

4.0.4.26

da75924c717524a8d17de126f8368ec4

2022-11-08

4.0.4.27

5971c4a485e881268ca28f24fdedc4e5

2022-11-16

4.0.4.30

22e45a212998d2ee264b6756b2972901

2022-11-28

4.0.4.46

accc6d9ba88040c89df34ef1749944d1

2022-12-13

4.0.4.52

22b3cb9b0bacd525a83aab5b1a853f63

2022-12-20

4.0.4.60

bebebd4e16a88f43f16e4c6c811c9894

2022-12-20

4.0.4.62

cafb7b2f8383cf9686f144dc2082f287

2022-12-22

4.0.4.66

6e3b4252903c0f3a153e011445ad2179

2023-01-31

4.0.4.432

3e3bc981a7fdbae10b40cd6683edacbb

2023-01-31

4.0.4.432

a12dd4324bbf1129d9fae1b3d1e6b9ca

2023-05-02

4.0.4.1035

ebec03d53d716cd780c92c5c29a95e6b

2023-05-10

4.0.4.1038

5e4c95b2c1b14a8a0f425576189fae60

2023-12-115.0.0.3268aec3f3ef66e4ff118bfdab1d031eadb

2023-12-13

5.0.0.361

46e169516479d0614b663f302b5d1ace

2023-12-19

5.0.0.370

795319d48ce1f680699beb03317c6bff

2024-01-22

5.0.0.484

de1d9ed6da4f34b4444b13442aac5033

2024-01-22

5.0.0.486

f382d0f92221831eeb39c108f8ccfa26

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